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A NEW APPROACH TO THE
PROFIT-SHARING TRUST
D. J. Donovan*

P

ENSION OR PROFIT-SHARING

plans are sufficiently well known to

lawyers and business men to make extended comment thereon
unnecessary. If such plans qualify under the Internal Revenue
Code,' they permit of tax advantages not otherwise possible in
that employers obtain the benefit of current deductions from income which would, but for the deduction, be taxable 2 while employees gain a form of future protection without adding to their
current tax burdens, being obliged to pay taxes only when they
actually receive distributions under such plans.3 These exceptions from general tax doctrines exist because of a firm public
policy to encourage incentive while also providing for the ultimate
retirement of employees from gainful occupation. Much has been
written on the subject of pension plans, but the profit-sharing
arrangement is a relative newcomer to the field. Some treatment
of the legal aspects thereof might, then, be of service, especially
* LL.B., Chicago-Kent College of Law. Member, Illinois Bar, and of Baker,
McKenzie, Hightower & Brainerd.
126 U. S. C. § 165(a).
"In computing net income there shall be allowed as
2 Ibid., § 23, provides:
deductions:... (p) Contributions of an employer to an employee's trust or annuity
plan and compensation under a deferred-payment plan ......
8 The tax burden is then, frequently, a lighter one as distribution usually occurs
on or after the date when higher exemptions favor the taxpayer, or comes at a time
when other taxable income, in the form of salary or wages, ceases to accrue.
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if particular attention is given to one approved plan now in operation which involved the marking out of at least two developments
not previously utilized.
I.

THB CONTROLLINo LAW

Any investigation of the legal elements involved in the profitsharing plan must start with the section of the Internal Revenue
Code which lays down the requirements for qualification of the
plan. In that connection, Section 165(a) thereof is the important
one for it, through six sub-paragraphs, specifies the tests to be
met.4 These tests may be summarized generally as requiring that
the plan (1) be for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their
beneficiaries; (2) be permanent in character; (3) be based on a
definite written program; (4) be designed to benefit the employees
generally, not some limited class thereof; and (5) be non-discriminatory in character. In addition to compliance therewith, in the
manner hereinafter specified, it would seem desirable to secure the
advance approval of the plan from the Internal Revenue Department, before putting the same into operation, in order that no
question be left open concerning the right of both employer and
employee to the benefit of the potential tax advantages in a profitsharing plan. 5
Concerning the first requirement, one which directs that the
plan must be for the exclusive benefit of the "employees," or
their beneficiaries, it should be noted that partners in a partner6
ship would not be eligible to participate in the profit-sharing plan,
they not being considered to be "employees" of the employer.
426 U. S. C. §§ 165(a) (1) to 165(a) (6), inclusive. For the purpose of this paper,
the non-trusteed annuity plan is left out of discussion. It should be noted, however,
that plans of this character must meet similar tests: I.R.B. 1953-6, Rev. Rul. 33,
p. 48.
5 While advance approval is not required as a condition precedent to tax benefits,
it is desirable to secure the same. Heretofore, applications for approval were made
to the Bureau in Washington. Since April 1, 1953, requests for advance rulings
should be made to the director of internal revenue in the appropriate district, as
defined in I.R.B. 1953-6, Rev. Rul. 32, pp. 44-5. Approval of a plan by one official
does not prevent a subsequent disapproval by another: H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh,
191 F. (2d) 831 (1951).
6 . T. 3350 (C.B. 1940-1, 64); P.S. No. 23. See also Bentley v. Commissioner,
14 T. C. 228 (1950), affirmed in 184 F. (2d) 668 (1950).
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On the other hand, professional workers, such as attorneys serving
on the employer's staff7 or life-insurance salesmen on a full-time
program" may be, within certain restrictions, 9 classed as such.
Wage-earners, whether on a salary basis or paid at hourly rates,
including executives, are eligible to be included within the plan,
if it is otherwise fair, but it is not necessary to extend the coverage of the plan to all employees on the payroll so long as the plan,
or plans, 10 do cover enough employees to meet the percentage
provisions of the statute" or those eligible to participate are
selected according to some scheme of classification set up by the
employer which does not discriminate in favor of officers, share2
holders, supervisors, or other highly-compensated workers.' It
might also be possible to fix different eligibility standards with
respect to present employees, on the one hand, and those who
might become employees in the future, on the other, so long as
the standard for new employees is not so weighted against them
as to disqualify present executive-type workers if they were to
be measured against such a standard. 13
The principal difficulty likely to be experienced with respect
to eligibility for benefits is apt to come when stockholders in the
7 I.R.B. 1953M, Rev. Rul. 33, p. 49, notes that the mere fact the practitioner also
has an independent income from the practice of his profession would not necessarily
preclude him from participating in the plan. He must, however, to be eligible, be
regarded as an employee for all other purposes, including social security and income
tax withholding measures.
826 U. S. C. § 3797(20), added in 1951, provides that such salesmen are "employees" for this purpose if they are considered as "employees" for the purposes of
26 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq., as well as for old-age and survivor insurance tax under
26 U. S. C. § 1426(d) (3) (B). This inclusion does not extend to insurance brokers
or those who are not employed on a full-time basis.
9 I.R.B. 1953-6, pp. 49-50.
1026 U. S. C. § 165(a) (3) permits an employer to designate several pension,
stock bonus, profit-sharing, and annuity plans as parts of an overall scheme. If
these plans, taken together, cover a sufficient portion of all employees, there is no
requirement that a definite portion of the employees should be included in any one
plan: I.R.B. 1953-6, p. 54.
11 See 26 U. S. C. § 165(a) (3) (A) and (B). The percentages there mentioned are
to be applied after excluding certain short service, seasonal, and part-time employees. Illustrations in this respect may be found in I.R.B. 1953-6, p. 55.
12 A plan may qualify even though limited to employees within a prescribed age
group, who have been employed for a stated number of years, or who have been
employed in certain designated departments of the employer's operations, provided
the effect of such selectivity does not discriminatorily favor those who fall within
the class mentioned: Commissioner v. Produce Reporter Co., 207 F. (2d) 586
(1953).
'8 See I.R.B. 1953-6, pp. 55-6.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

employing corporation, although bona-fide employees in all other
respects, seek to participate in the profit-sharing plan or wish to
have the same extended for their benefit. The mere fact that one
is a shareholder should not serve to disqualify for the profit-sharing plan would then work at cross-purpose with the highly desirable modern attitude which encourages workers to become partowners of the businesses in which they are employed. The presence of a number of small shareholder-employees in the covered
group would probably create no problems.
Quite frequently, however, especially among the smaller corporations, the shares of stock, or a majority thereof, will be
closely held by the founder, by the members of his family, or by
these persons and a few key employees. It is also frequently
the case that these persons serve the corporation, as its employees, while occupying varied executive positions. Their presence in the plan would not necessarily condemn the arrangement
but, if it is designed primarily for their benefit or as a subterfuge for the distribution of corporate profits to them otherwise
than as dividends, the plan would probably fail to receive approval even though it included all the other employees. 4 Care
must be taken, therefore, to see to it that the terms of eligibility
are not so weighted, with respect both to participation and contribution, in favor of stockholder-employees of this last-mentioned
type, for rejection of the plan would then follow. 15
Since the profit-sharing plan is intended for the benefit of
employees or their beneficiaries, 6 the plan should be so drafted
as to permit the covered employees to select their own beneficiaries as a matter of right and, without dictation from the employer. 17 Any provision which would tend to eliminate this right,
or hamper the employee in its exercise, would probably be con14

I. T. 4020 (C.B. 1950-2, 61).

(1938).

See also Parker v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 989

15 Voclkening, Inc. v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 723 (1949).

1626 U. S. C. 1165(a).
17 For this purpose, Reg. 111, § 29.165-1 (a), defines "beneficiaries" as "...
any
persons designated by the employee to share in the benefits of the plan after the
death of the employee." Italics added.
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strued to turn the plan into one other than a scheme for the
exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries. Provisions
in a plan under which an advisory committee, or other administrative body, would be charged with the function of selecting or
designating the beneficiary, with or without consulting the employee, or calling for the compilation of lists restricted to specifled groups of beneficiaries from among which the employee was
to make a choice, would serve as illustrations of hampering restrictions.' 8 It would, however, appear to be proper to insert a
provision to the effect that, upon the failure of the employee to
make a designation, the distributions could be made to close relatives of the employee, in a stated order of priority, or to the estate of the deceased employee.' 9 Certainly, in the last-mentioned
instance, the right of designation would be preserved for the
employee could, by exercising his right to make a will, channel the
distributions in any manner he saw fit.
The second requirement which will have to be observed, if the
profit-sharing plan is to receive approval, contemplates that the
plan must be one of permanent character and intended to serve
as a continuing program. 20 Certainly, the employer may not,
for this reason, reserve the right to terminate the trust as to the
past.2 ' For that matter, the plan could not, for example, be set up
during periods of high corporate taxes and then be abandoned,
without valid business reasons, when profits fell off or tax burdens
declined, particularly not if there was any thought of reinstat22
ing the plan when, and if, the tax burden again increased.
Business men, above all, know that no arrangement is permanent within the full meaning of that term but what is here contemplated is that the proposed plan should not be one intended to
18 Consider, in this respect, the pension trust plan concerned in the case of
Lichter v. Commissioner, 201 F. (2d) 49 (1952), cert. den. 345 U. S. 942, 73 S. Ct.
833, 97 L, Ed. 1368 (1953).
19 I.R.B. 1953-6, p. 50.
20 But see Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F. (2d) 326 (1951).
21 As to the employer's ability to provide for a contingent right to terminate in
the event approval cannot be secured, see Service Combustion Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 631 (1947).
22 I.R.B. 195K-6, p. 50.
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serve merely as a temporary expedient but should be intended to
continue indefinitely unless, or until, supervening circumstances
made further continuance impracticable or forced the making of
some sort of amendment to the original plan.
Obviously, the varied facts likely to develop in assorted cases
prevent the laying down of any prescribed rule intended to determine whether any given plan would be a "permanent" one,
on the termination of which no unexpected tax repercussions would
be likely to occur, 2 3 or would be considered to be no more than
a subterfuge, leading to a reopening of tax liability. To this
point, satisfactory reasons for termination have been found to
exist where bankruptcy or insolvency has intervened, 24 where the
proposal failed to receive the approval of the Salary Stabilization Board, 25 or where there has been a financial inability to continue to meet the cost of the plan. 26 It can be seen, therefore,
that this requirement calls for serious attention on the part of the
corporation before it sets up a profit-sharing plan.
Plans of this character must, by the third requirement, be in
written form, with the program being drafted so as to include
therein all provisions essential to qualification. As the normal
plan would call for the use of a trust, 27 the trust instrument should
not only be fully executed but should be drawn in such form as
to be valid according to the law of the appropriate jurisdiction. 2
Although an oral trust might be effective in law for other purposes, this one must be in writing and nothing less will suffice. 29
There is no requirement, however, that only the services of a corP.S. No. 60 and P.S. No. 56 -have bearing on this point.
Mimeo. 6136 C.B. 1947-1, 58.
25 Blume Knitwear, Inc. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 1179 (1947).
26 T. D. 5278, C.B. 1943, 478 and 481.
With respect
27 Non-trusteed plans have been omitted from this discussion.
thereto, see Mimeo. 6020, C.B. 1946-1, 74, and Merrill Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
21 B. T. A. 1409 (1931).
28 Mimeo. 5985, C.B. 1946-1, 72. See also Wooster Rubber Co. v. Commissioner,
189 F. (2d) 878 (1951).
2926 U. S. C. § 165(a) (2). See also Mimeo. 5985, C.B. 1946-1, 72, and Mimeo.
6394, C.B. 1949-1, 118.
23
24
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porate trustee be retained 30 so, to the extent permitted by law,
a human being may serve in the capacity of trustee, or several
such persons may be called upon to act as trustees.8 1 Naturally,
if humans do serve, the agreement should provide, to preserve
continuity in the arrangement, against such contingencies as disability, resignation or death. If a corporate trustee is used,
attention should be given to such matters as corporate consolidation and succession. No standard form of trust agreement for
use in conjunction with profit-sharing plans can be said to exist,
but it goes without saying that, as this instrument will be the
back-bone of the whole arrangement, it should be skilfully and
carefully drawn.
Some aspects of the fourth condition, one dealing with employee coverage generally, have already been considered. It has
been noted that it is not necessary that all employees be included
but, the purpose being to provide for employees generally, the
plan should not be so restrictive as to confine the operations and
advantages thereof to a favored few. In that connection, the plan
should be so drawn as to cover either a number at least equal to
the one prescribed by statute 82 or else be drafted so as, to benefit
those who qualify under some form of non-discriminatory classification such as is permitted by law. 3 3 Classification schemes do
sometimes, on paper, appear to be non-discriminatory but more
than that will be needed, for they must be non-discriminatory in
actual operation if they are to pass muster.
For example, a plan which ostensibly covers an entire class
would appear to be satisfactory on the surface but it might contain a stipulation that non-forfeitable rights accrue only to those
employees who have completed a substantial term of service and
30 A corporation could be organized for the specific purpose of operating the
profit-sharing plan, if permitted to do so by local law: Tavannes Watch Co. v.
Commissioner, 176 F. (2d) 211 (1949).
31 If several serve, unanimous action on their part would normally be necessary
unless the trust instrument provided for majority determination.
32 26 U. S. C. § 165 (a) (3) (A) specifies, as alternatives, that the benefits must
extend (1) to 70% or more of all employees, or (2) to 70% of those eligible for
benefits provided at least 80% thereof are actually covered into the profit-sharing
system.
38 See 26 U. S. C. § 165(a) (3) (B) and I.R.B. 1953-6, pp. 54-6.
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who remain in employment until the normal retirement age. If
the staff of the employer, except for a handful of persons in
executive positions, should consist principally of transient workers,
being those who remain on the job a relatively short period of
time and then move on, the benefits of the plan would accrue to
no more than a few top employees, hence the scheme would probably be denied approval.3 4 The same thing might also be said to
be true with respect to rules providing for re-entrance into the
plan after a period of discontinuance, to rules governing the continuation of participation in the event a leave of absence is
granted, or to various forms of limitation which may attach because of a failure to enter the plan upon, or within a reasonable
time after, becoming eligible, unless such rules are so drafted as
35
to be completely uniform in operation.
Probably the most important of the five requirements is the
one which demands that there must be no discrimination with respect to contributions or benefits. The statute does not intend
that an absolute equality should be preserved among the participating employees, that each should receive precisely the same
credits in the fund, or be given exactly the same benefits on retirement or death, any more than it contemplates treating each
covered employee according to his needs without giving consideration to the degree of contribution he has made to the success
of the employer. It being well within the American tradition to
reward each according to his ability or industry, a profit-sharing
plan which paid benefits according to units of compensation, units
of service, or on the basis of some factor produced by a multiplication of these elements, would not necessarily be objectionable
84 Solution of this issue depends, to some extent, on whether the benefits provided
by the plan are to be considered as vested in the employees at the time contribution
is made or whether vesting is postponed until some later date. See I.R.B. 1953-6,

pp. 60-1.
35 These matters are of considerable moment in connection with plans calling for
employee contributions to the fund, or in relation to certain insurance plans, for
an employee may refuse to sign an authorization for the deduction of participation
payments from his salary or may refuse to take the necessary medical examination.
They are less likely to be involved in profit-sharing plans. The matter of regulating
the effect of leave of absence, however, whether because of sickness, disability, or
service in the armed forces, should not be overlooked in plans of this character.
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so long as it was not top-heavy and did not result in a showing
36
of favoritism toward the higher paid employees.
It would, for that matter, be possible to set up a scheme which
varied benefits under a distribution formula based on years of
service,3 7 again provided the formula did not operate to allocate
a disproportionate share of the benefits to that group in whose
interest no discrimination is permitted. 8 It can only be said,
however, that there is no sure-fire system which would inevitably
receive approval any more than there is one clear formula which
would always be disapproved. Any formula adopted must stand
or fall on the basis of the result it produces in the given case so
if, in operation, it proves to be non-discriminatory, no matter what
form it takes, this crucial test will have been met. It might be
added, by way of a word of caution, that forfeiture provisions included within a plan might also be considered as being capable of
producing a degree of discrimination, even though the initial plan
for contribution and benefits might otherwise be satisfactory.8 9
If so, disapproval would follow.
Discrimination may also come about in connection with the
terms used to define the vesting of employees' rights under the
plan. It is not essential, to secure qualification, that the employee
be granted vested rights in the employer's contributions upon
adoption of the plan or upon becoming eligible to participate
therein. There must, however, be some fixed and determinable
period at which the employee is to receive vested rights and the
postponement thereof beyond that point would invoke criticism.
With respect to pension plans, a variety of provisions are now
in use, ranging from those providing for complete and immediate
vesting down through different gradations to others making benefits contingent until the attainment of a stated retirement age,
usually at 65. By analogy thereto, and provided the deferment
86 1.

T. 3686, C.B. 1944, 326.

87 1. T. 3685, C.B. 1944, 324.
33 For example, a profit-sharing plan which allocated benefits at the rate of 20%

to officers, shareholders and executive employees but gave only 10% to all other
employees would fail to meet statutory requirements: I. T. 3678, C. B. 1944, 821.
89 See I.R.B. 1953-6, pp. 59-60.
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rests on reasonable grounds, 40 the use of uniform provisions in
a profit-sharing trust, deferring the vesting of the employee's
rights not later than the normal retirement age, would probably
not be open to objection. 4 1 Again, the question is one as to
whether or not the provisions will, in fact, operate without discrimination in favor of those in whose interest no discrimination
is permitted.
The law in general recognizes the possibility that a vested
interest may be divested upon the happening of designated contingencies, provided those contingencies are clearly and distinctly
specified. 42 There would seem to be room, in a profit-sharing plan,
for utilization of this idea, especially where the benefited employee
is one who, by reason of the nature of his service, might have
come into possession of secret and valuable information of vital
concern to the employer. Independently of any express contract
on the point, such an employee might be prevented, on leaving his
employment, from making this information available to a competing employer 43 and, if a valid contract existed on the point,
from even taking employment with a competitor, at least for a
reasonable period of time. 4 4 In the light thereof, it would seem
not improper to condition the employee's right to benefits under
the profit-sharing plan for the period of his continued loyalty
to the employer or, conversely, to provide for a discontinuance,
or some lessening, of benefits if a breach thereof occurred. Naturally, since equity abhors forfeitures, provisions of this character
should rest in reason and be sharply defined but, in addition
thereto, for tax purposes, the effect of a forfeiture must not be
such as to increase disproportionately the shares due to top-flight
officers and employees.
Pension plans are often criticized because, under the conP.S. No. 22.
41 I.R.B. 1953-6, p. 64, makes provision for the treatment to be accorded to
employees who remain in employment beyond the stated age.
42 Simes, Handbook on the Law of Future Interests (West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, 1953), pp. 44-7.
43 McClintock, Handbook of Equity (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1936), pp.
265-6.
44 Ibid., pp. 267-8.
40
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trolling formula and by reason of age or magnitude of salary
earned, they too frequently favor the top-bracket employees. Tax
45
limitations have, therefore, been imposed with regard thereto.
While similar rules are not applicable to profit-sharing plans, for
acceptable formulae are intended to preclude discrimination under
comparable circumstances, other problems are likely to develop
from provisions regarding termination. In that connection, the
Internal Revenue Code declares that a plan will not be discriminatory "merely because the contributions or benefits . . . bear a
uniform relationship to the total compensation. ' ' 46 Total compensation, of course, could very easily include overtime pay,
commissions, bonuses, etc., in addition to basic compensation or
regular hourly rates, 47 so a sudden increase in any one of these
factors shortly before retirement would be likely to affect the
amount of benefits payable and might produce imbalance.
In that connection, any proposed formula should be given
careful study. In one instance, for example, provision was made
for two groups of employees, the first consisting of shareholders,
officers, and other supervisory personnel, the other being made
up of ordinary workers. It was deemed to be discriminatory in
that, as there was no reason for differentiating between them,
both groups should have been treated alike. 48 In another, where
a years-of-service factor produced a lowest salary group credit
equal to 3.33 per cent. of salary but produced one of fifty per cent.
for the highest salary group, discrimination was found to be
present.4 9 A third case also used a years-of-service factor which
resulted in the lowest group receiving a six per cent. salary credit,
the highest group one of 8.88 per cent., but gave the intermediate
group the equivalent of twenty per cent. It was also treated as
being discriminatory. 50 To offset this possibility and to prevent
45

See Mimeo. 5717, C.B. 1944, 321.
See also Reg. 111, § 29.165-1(a).

4626 U. s. C. § 165(a) (5).

47 Compensation paid must be reasonable in the light of the service rendered:
Charles E. Smith & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F. (2d) 1011 (1950).
48 1. T. 3678, C.B. 1944, 321.

49 1. T. 3686, C.B. 1944, 326.
50 P.S. No. 28, Sept. 2, 1944.
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any "loading" of the formula by large increases in compensation
shortly before retirement, the plan should be so drafted as to
require the spreading of the total compensation received over a
sufficient number of years of service to furnish a reasonable base
for the allocation of benefits. 51
In addition to the foregoing requirements, it should also be
noted that, as the trust created under the profit-sharing plan is
to be one for the exclusive benefit of the covered employees, or
their beneficiaries, no diversion from the terms of the trust can
be permitted. To insure against this, the trust agreement should
specify that it is not possible, prior to the satisfaction of all
liabilities to the covered employees, or their beneficiaries, to divert
any part of the corpus or the income arising therefrom, 5 2 and
should also specify against the possibility of a reversion in favor
of the employer. The mere fact that some incidental benefit may
inure to others, even to the employer, will not produce criticism
in this connection, so long as the primary purpose of benefiting
the employees is maintained. 53
Funds supplied to the trustee under a profit-sharing plan
would, normally, be kept invested until needed, would produce
income, and might even result in the production of a profit.5 4 If
so, the income and profits ought to be allocated among the covered
employees in accordance with some uniform formula without
discrimination. To insure faithful operation according to the
plan in these and other respects, the trustee should, therefore,
be required to maintain an inventory and complete records and
to make annual reports. The plan should require that a valuation
of all securities held be taken on a specified inventory date, in
51 Under this same general classification, attention must be given to provisions
intended to deal with disability and hardship cases. If these provisions are loaded
in favor of the higher-paid employees, they will probably produce disqualification

of the plan.
52 I.R.B. 1953-6, pp. 52-3. See also Alldis Estate v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1171
(1942), affirmed in 140 F. (2d) 885 (1942).
53 A purchase of securities by the trustee may, to some extent, benefit the vendor,
but would be treated as an incidental benefit if the purchase was made in the best
interests of the trust: I.R.B. 1953-6, p. 51.
54 The making of a profit does not, of itself, show there was an improper diver-

sion of corporate assets to the trust: H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F. (2d) 831
(1951).
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accordance with a method consistently followed and uniformly
applied, but the use of a fair market value on the inventory date
would probably prove to be acceptable. On the basis thereof, the
accounts of the respective participants should, at least annually,
be adjusted accordingly and, as reserves would not be needed in
a profit-sharing plan as contrasted with a pension plan, full allotment should be made to each account. If suspense accounts are
used to accumulate cash until an investment thereof can be made,
the respective shares of the several beneficiaries in these funds
should also be determined periodically.
A question might well arise as to the right of the trustee to
invest the funds of the profit-sharing trust in securities of various
types, possibly even in stock or other securities issued by the
employer. The question is primarily one to be resolved by local
law. 55 If investments of that character are appropriate trust
investments, the plan would not be denied approval merely because it authorized the trustee to so invest and might, by providing a market, thereby produce an incidental benefit to the employer. There is, however, in that situation, the basis for an
inference that a trust including an authority of this nature might
have been created for purposes other than those intended exclusively to benefit the employees, so the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has promulgated a ruling requiring that the local director
be furnished with certain specified information in the event any
of the employer's securities are to be acquired by the trustee. 56
It would, then, be necessary to provide this information along with
all other required materials. 5 7 To prevent delay in securing approval, all documents necessarily involved in the proposed plan
should be submitted at one time.
55 In that connection, note Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 148, § 32 et seq.,
adopting the "prudent man" rule for this state except where the trust instrument
provides otherwise.
56 I.R.B. 1953-6, Rev. Rul. 32, and see also pp. 51-2 thereof.
57 See Reg. 111, § 29.23(p) -2 and § 29.165-1(c). I.R.B. 1953-6, Rev. Rul. 33, Part
2(g), also requires that the employees be given notice not only with respect to the
establishment of the plan but also as to its salient provisions. While the most
effective way to give notice would be to furnish each employee with a complete
copy of the plan, substitute methods may be utilized. In the event a substitute is
to be used, it would be desirable to submit a copy of the proposed substitute along
with all other documents.
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A NEw APPLICATION

The preceding analysis of the legal aspects involved in a
profit-sharing trust can be made more definite when considered
in the light of an actual application which received approval. A
small manufacturing corporation, best here described as X Company, had earned profits of approximately $50,000 per year. A
majority of the outstanding stock was held by one family, consisting of the founder and his two sons, who served the corporation as its officers. The president, with a salary of $20,000 a year,
had been an employee for twenty-five years. The secretary,
earning $15,000 a year, had served for twenty years. The treasurer, paid $10,000 a year, had worked for ten years. In addition,
the corporation carried thirty-two other employees on the payroll,
two of whom served in supervisory capacities and the balance in
performing subordinate functions. 5s All employees, except for
the three officers, were paid at hourly rates, and punched time in
and out on a clock. To this point, the employees were not unionized, although talk of a union had become prevalent.
Production at the plant had begun to fall off, evidently because of increasing absenteeism or tardiness on the part of the
employees. There was need for a stimulus of some sort if the
corporation was to continue as a success, yet any stimulus which
would be provided by a general increase in the level of salaries,
or in the dividends paid to the stockholder officers, would merely
increase tax burdens and prevent the setting aside of reserves for
the future. In the light thereof, the corporation caused an investigation to be made of the possibility of adopting some form of
profit-sharing plan with the belief in mind that it might, thereby,
(1) reduce absenteeism and tardiness, (2) prevent, or at least
reduce, the possibility of unionization, (3) defer distribution of
some of the corporate profits, (4) prevent an increase in personal
58 The two supervisors, with thirty-four years of service between them, each
earned $10,000 a year. Six other employees, in the $8,000-$10,000 salary range,
had accumulated 88 years of service credit; ten, earning from $6,000 to $8,000,
had totalled 93 years of service; eleven others, in a $4,000-$6,000 bracket, aggregated 75 years; the remaining three, earning between $2,000 and $4,000, had only
12 years of service credit.
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income taxes while establishing reserves for the future and against
retirement, (5) create or enhance employee interest in the business, while (6) retaining control over the plan on the part of the
corporation. The general idea appeared to be a simple one to
fulfill, but the working out of the detailed steps called for careful
study and the development of some innovations not present in
ordinary profit-sharing plans.
In the first place, adoption of the normal method of distributing profits on the basis of a formula composed from years
of service and salary range would not provide any solution for the
problem arising from absenteeism and tardiness. In addition,
such a formula could well have made the arrangement top-heavy.
Instead, it was decided to set up a formula based on "security
points," with distribution of profits to be made on the basis of
the total number of points so earned. Calculation was made by
granting one security point for each year of service, two points
for each month of perfect attendance, and two points for each
month in which the employee was punctual. Further emphasis
on attendance and punctuality was provided by authorizing a
deduction from these security points, where proper, scaled at the
rate of two points to be deducted for each day of absence during
the month and two points for each day late, but with a maximum
limitation that not more than six points were to be deducted in
any one month.
Determination as to the number of security points which
could be earned was but part of the job for, except as to years
of service, it would have been theoretically possible for each
employee to earn as many points as the next man, hence be
entitled to share equally in all distributions, even though his
contribution to the earning of profits might have been inferior to
that of the others. It became necessary, therefore, to blend into
the formula the element of compensation paid, thereby granting
recognition to such matters as overtime pay, higher salary for
relatively higher service, and the like. This was done by taking
the total compensation earned and multiplying it by the earned
total of security points and thereafter reducing the product by
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three decimal points.5 9 This factor then determined the relative
share of the profits to be allocated to each employee, with the
dollar and cent value credited to each being fixed by dividing the
total number of points earned by all employees during the period
into the amount of profits available for distribution and then
multiplying the unit value so ascertained by the appropriate factor
for the particular employee.
Once this formula had been decided upon, other problems began to arise. It was noted that there was nothing in the proposal to
prevent an employee from coming regularly and punctually to
work but thereafter leaving without giving full service. To prevent such an employee from earning security points, it was
necessary to provide a definition for the working day. The matter
of vesting the shares of the several employees in the fund called
for attention, but it was solved, to head off any tendency to quit
employment too rapidly, by permitting the annual vesting of ten
per cent. of the amount allocated for ten consecutive years and
then vesting the entire amount together with all amounts paid
thereafter. Other issues were resolved as fairly as possible in
favor of the employees.6 0
Realizing that certain inequities might develop in the actual
operation of the plan, both with respect to the formula and the
vesting provisions, and also in the application of certain features
relating to forfeiture, which the trustees might not wish to be
obliged to resolve or even be faced with, the trust agreement
embodying the plan provided for the creation of a "welfare"
board composed of two employees chosen by the workers, two
of the three trustees, and one representative selected by the corporate management. This board was to act, in the main, in an
advisory capacity to the trustees but was given the power to
determine whether a different scale of forfeiture should be applied
in well-defined hardship cases, to settle disputes between the
59 This reduction was made to bring all figures into line in terms of units for
each $1,000 earned. If the base for calculating shares had been $100, only two
decimal points would have been marked off.
6o Naturally, among other things, the plan had to make it clear that the employees were possessed of an unqualified right to designate their own beneficiaries.
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employees and the trustees, and to determine amounts earned
under the plan if any question arose with respect thereto.6 ' Inasmuch as two of the three trustees were to be officers of, and
stockholders in, the corporation and the trustees collectively had
full discretionary power over the operation of the trust, with full
advisory control resting in a majority of the welfare board, the
net result was to place the corporation in a position of dominance,
able to control both the operations of the plant and the profitsharing trust.
It appeared, up to this point, that no profit-sharing trust containing features of the type mentioned, particularly with respect
to the security-point formula and the grant of discretionary powers
to a welfare board, had been treated as qualified for tax purposes
by the Internal Revenue Department. The decision was made,
nevertheless, to submit the plan so drafted for approval and, if
necessary, to amend the trust later. The required documents were,
accordingly, prepared and the plan was submitted together with
a chart 2 designed to reveal the working operation of the security
point formula. Objection came at the points anticipated. Those
relating to the powers of the welfare board were easily handled
by amendments designed to make it clear that the board was to
handle all cases possessing similar facts which came before it in
a similar manner, so as to obliterate any possible semblance of
power to discriminate. Actually, however, these amendments
possessed little of significance for few cases could arise with
sufficiently similar facts to call for identical board action.
The prime disagreement came with respect to the security
point formula. The original chart, involving a division of the
employees into six classes determined according to salary range 63
61 The grant of more extended powers to an advisory board is lkely to cause
difficulty; Lichter v. Commissioner, 201 F. (2d) 49 (1952), cert. den. 345 U. S.
942, 73 S. Ct. 833, 97 L. Ed. 1368 (1953).
62 The chart was submitted pursuant to I. T. 3085 and I. T. 3686, C.B. 1944, 324

and 326.
63 Class 1 included only the president and the secretary, ranging from $15,000
to $20,000. Class 2 Included the treasurer and the two supervisory employees, in

the $10,000-$15,000 bracket. Class 3 was formed by the six who earned between
$8,000 and $10,000. Class 4 was made up by the ten workers in the $6,000-$8,000
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showed a distribution of trust benefits ranging from slightly more
than six per cent. for the top executives to a maximum percentage
of 8.845 for the lowest class, with some variation in between. It
had been compiled on the basis of actual conditions and plant
records covering the period immediately prior to the submission
of the proposal.
While no criticism was expressed as to the use of classes of
beneficiaries and none could be made with regard to coverage
requirements, for all employees were included, an objection was
advanced that the original chart did not take into consideration
the possibility that every employee covered by the plan might,
in some ensuing period, have a perfect record, hence it was not
clear that discrimination could not occur. A new chart, using the
same classifications, was then compiled to illustrate that theory.
Although the other statistical data remained the same, the revised
chart, which included the maximum possible number of points
which could be earned for service, attendance, and punctuality,
revealed that the percentages of allotment would then vary from
a high of 8.344 to a low of 6.649, with the upper brackets being
favored over the less well-paid employees. Naturally, the agent
in charge refused to approve a plan which, while not likely to
operate in that precise fashion, appeared to discriminate in favor
of those in whose behalf discrimination is not permitted.
Since no amount of juggling of figures would produce an
acceptable formula, it was then decided to make one amendment
in the security point idea so as to confine the calculation of
benefits to the first $10,000 of compensation earned. By reducing
this one of the several basic factors used in fixing benefits under
the plan, it was possible then to prepare still a third chart which,
while allowing for the assumption of perfect attendance and
punctuality, nevertheless brought the individual percentages more
nearly into line with one another. This combination of the first
and second charts, after making allowance for the basic earning
category. Class 5 Included the eleven workers who were paid from $4,000 to
$6,000. The last class contained the three who earned less than $4,000. Particulars

with respect to years of service are set forth in note 58, ante.
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factor, then revealed that the officer-stockholder employees would
probably receive a percentage of benefits equivalent to less than
six per cent. on their total compensation, while the less well-paid
employees would probably be credited with amounts ranging from
6.918% to 8.648%. As the Internal Revenue Department does not
insist upon absolute equality of treatment for all beneficiaries in
a profit-sharing plan, being concerned more nearly with whether
or not the arrangement is one weighted in favor of stockholder or
top-flight employees, this proposal received approval. While some
major amendments to the trust agreement thereby became necessary, these changes related to matters of form rather than substance. With the principal objectives left untouched, the X Company instituted the profit-sharing plan so approved and began to
work under it.
There should be little need to comment on the effectiveness
of the arrangement. Within two months, absenteeism was cut
drastically, punctuality became the rule rather than the exception,
production increased steadily and profits began to mount. Not
only did the company enjoy a decrease in labor turnover but the
presence of the plan furnished an inducement for the ready hiring
of new, and better qualified, employees. Talk of organizing a
union soon vanished and worker morale improved. Without any
special action on the part of the management, employees searched
for methods to prevent waste as they came to realize that the
more profits there were available for distribution the larger their
credits would be. In much the same way, the employee-stockholders
prospered, not only by the strengthening of their investment in
the corporation but also by being able to channel some of the
funds which would otherwise have been paid out in the form of
taxable dividends into a reserve against the future.
These end products are not particularly or peculiarly the
result of a profit-sharing plan embodying a security point formula,
for other employers, with varied welfare and benefit plans, have
enjoyed similar experiences. It is believed, however, that formulae
of this type make much more flexible arrangements possible and,
now that one approval has been secured, the security point
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formula will likely become a more widely used device in the
future. 1 It should not be assumed that the precise composition
of the formula used in the X Company situation must be slavishly
followed, for units of production, units based on saving, or
measured by safety record, or a variety of other factors could
be substituted for units based on attendance and punctuality.
The important thing is to see to it (1) that the elements of the
formula are based in reason and are not unduly weighted in relation to each other, (2) that the statement of the formula is carefully set forth by an attorney familiar with statutory requirements, and (3) that the overall operation thereof in a given case
can be demonstrated to be just without evidencing a tendency to
discriminate in favor of top-level executives. The giving of due
observance to these points should facilitate the obtaining of
approval for the profit-sharing plan.

64 It is understood that the House Ways and Means Committee has made recommendations with respect to certain statutory revisions which could affect the
overall picture, but congressional acion will be needed to put these recommendations
into effect.

